
Gender Stereotypes and the Policy Priorities of Women in Congress

Supporting Information

April 2, 2018

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
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Figure A1: Predicted Count of Bills Sponsored by Party and Gender



1 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions from Main Document

Tables A1 and A2 report the results of the coefficients from the series of Seemingly Unrelated Regression models reported graphically in the main text. Table A1 reports the model with women pooled together, while Table A2 distinguishes between both gender and party.

2 Models Broken Down by Party

3 Competition and Gender Comparisons

An alternative explanation could be that electoral competition is the driving factor behind the agenda behavior of women. In Tables A5–A7 we include an indicator variable for electoral competition and gender. As evident by these tables, women, regardless of their level of electoral

Table A1: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Predicting Legislative Issue Concentration

Dependent Variable	Female Legislators
Macroeconomics	-1.597* (.35)
Civil Rights, Liberties, and Minority Issues	0.612* (.22)
Health	4.308* (.48)
Agriculture	-.693+ (.37)
Labor, Employment, and Immigration	0.818+ (.42)
Education	0.802* (.34)
Environment	-0.297 (.37)
Energy	-0.931* (.33)
Transportation	0.161 (.42)
Law, Crime and Family	0.945* (.42)
Social Welfare	0.743* (0.31)
Community Development and Housing	-0.182 (.25)
Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce	-0.666 (0.41)
Defense	0.403 (.49)
Space, Science, Technology	-0.137 (0.22)
Foreign Trade	-0.885+ (0.49)
International Affairs	0.211 (.28)
Government Operations	-1.011+ (0.62)
Public Lands and Water Management	-2.451* (.59)

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05

Cell entries are regression coefficients for the Female indicator variable. In the left hand column are the dependent variables from the 20 regressions estimated in the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions equation. For space considerations, only the variables of interest are reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table A2: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Predicting Legislative Issue Concentration

Dependent Variable	Male Democrats	Female Republicans	Female Democrats
Macroeconomics	-1.434* (0.20)	-2.600* (0.58)	-2.308* (0.46)
Civil Rights, Liberties, and Minority Issues	-1.026* (0.12)	0.035 (0.36)	0.032 (0.28)
Health	1.132* (0.27)	3.622* (0.77)	5.698* (0.60)
Agriculture	-0.495* (0.21)	-1.060+ (0.61)	-0.056 (0.47)
Labor, Employment, and Immigration	-0.742* (0.23)	0.454 (0.67)	0.361 (0.53)
Education	0.134 (0.19)	0.358 (0.56)	1.149* (0.43)
Environment	0.650* (0.212)	-0.324 (0.60)	0.284 (0.48)
Energy	1.039* (0.19)	-0.420 (0.55)	-0.385 (0.43)
Transportation	0.064 (.23)	0.496 (0.67)	0.021 (0.52)
Law, Crime and Family	-1.372* (.24)	1.263+ (0.69)	-0.434 (0.53)
Social Welfare	0.334* (0.17)	0.335 (0.51)	0.665+ (0.39)
Community Development and Housing	-0.332* (0.14)	0.179 (0.41)	-.0672* (0.32)
Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce	0.599* (0.23)	-0.865 (0.67)	-0.034 (0.52)
Defense	0.861* (0.27)	-0.993 (0.80)	1.924* (0.62)
Space, Science, Technology	0.122 (0.12)	-0.010 (0.35)	-0.091 (0.28)
Foreign Trade	-0.669* (0.28)	0.131 (0.79)	-1.966* (0.62)
International Affairs	0.024 (0.16)	0.601 (0.45)	0.020 (0.36)
Government Operations	-1.878* (0.35)	0.198 (1.00)	-3.304* (0.78)
Public Lands and Water Management	2.005* (0.34)	-1.089 (0.96)	-1.461* (0.75)

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05

Cell entries are regression coefficients for the party-gender indicator variable. Male republicans are the baseline category. In the left hand column are the dependent variables from the 20 regressions estimated in the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions equation. For space considerations, only the variables of interest are reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table A3: Time Series Negative Binomial Predicting the Number of Bills Sponsored by Party and Gender

Variable	Coefficient
Bills Sponsored _{t-1}	0.007* (0.00)
Male Democrat	0.029 (0.03)
Female Republican	0.180* (0.08)
Female Democrat	0.211* (0.06)
Previous Electoral Margin	-0.001* (0.00)
Widow	-0.019 (0.17)
Service Time	-0.005* (0.00)
Racial Minority	-0.102* (0.05)
Committee Chair	0.238* (0.03)
Party Leader	-0.309* (0.07)
District Effects Factor	-0.031+ (0.02)
Majority Party Member	0.689* (0.05)
Constant	2.755* (0.06)
N	7,555
Wald Chi ²	4051.59

* p<0.05, +p< .1

Cell entries report coefficients from a Time Series Negative Binomial regression. Congress dummy variables are not included in the presentation of the models. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A4: Time Series OLS Model Estimating Agenda Concentration by Party and Gender

Variable	Coefficient
HHI_{t-1}	0.402* (0.01)
Male Democrats	-5.323 (43.27)
Female Republicans	-218.720+ (123.50)
Female Democrats	-264.180* (97.05)
Previous Electoral Margin	-0.431 (0.65)
Widow	-133.393 (264.69)
Service Time	29.667* (4.89)
Racial Minority	88.242 (79.15)
Committee Chair	13.535 (75.73)
Party Leader	281.226+ (164.72)
District Effects Factor	72.365* (36.39)
Majority Party Member	-513.916* (114.59)
Constant	1983.241* (188.67)
R^2	0.5373
N	7,493

* $p < 0.05$, + $p < .1$

Cell entries report Time Series OLS Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Congress dummy variables are not included in the presentation of the models.

Figure A2: Predicted Herfindal-Hirschman Index by Party and Gender




Figure A3: Predicted Agenda Concentration by Party and Gender





Figure A4: Predicted Agenda Concentration by Party and Gender



security, exhibit the same type of sponsorship behavior.

4 Models Broken Down by Party and Competition

5 Models Broken Down by Congressional “Eras”

It is plausible that there could be differing expectations on the behavior of women changing over time, we break our analysis up into two “eras” to account for institutional change. Our eras range from 1947-1970 (80-91), 1971-1992 (92-102), and 1993-2009 (103-110). As noted in the manuscript, we begin our analysis in 1963 when a majority of women serving were elected in their own right. We begin this analysis with a first “era” from 1963-1970. We end this era in 1970 to begin accounting for the Congressional Reforms of the 1970s.¹ Our second era runs from the beginning of the reform era of Congress through the 1992 elections dubbed “The Year of the Woman.” The third era represents Congress with an increased number of women, and arguably a “critical mass” of women representatives. This allows us to examine how the changing Congressional landscape from both an institutional and makeup perspective can influence agenda behavior. Our results indicate the post-reform and post-1992 elections are comparable to the models reported in the manuscript. The pre-reform era is the smallest in length and also has a paucity of women serving in Congress. Tables A12–A14 report the results of these models.

¹We classify the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 and the recommendation put forth by the Hansen Committee as the beginning of the Congressional reforms of the 1970s

Table A5: Time Series Negative Binomial Predicting the Number of Bills Sponsored by Competition and Gender

Variable	Coefficient
Bills Sponsored _{t-1}	0.007* (0.00)
Marginal Male	0.029 (0.02)
Safe Female	0.219* (0.05)
Marginal Female	0.175* (0.07)
Widow	-0.018 (0.18)
Service Time	-0.005* (0.00)
Racial Minority	-0.130* (0.05)
Committee Chair	0.238* (0.03)
Party Leader	-0.340* (0.07)
Party	-0.000 (0.00)
District Effects Factor	-0.052* (0.02)
Constant	2.732* (0.06)
Wald Chi ²	4072.23
N	7612

* p<0.05

Cell entries report coefficients from a Time Series Negative Binomial regression. Congress dummy variables are not included in the presentation of the models. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A6: Time Series OLS Model Estimating Agenda Concentration Competition and Gender

Variable	Coefficient
HHI _{t-1}	0.402* (39.48)
Marginal Males	-52.031 (44.02)
Safe Females	-269.418* (84.06)
Marginal Females	-190.051 (158.43)
Widow	-122.653 (265.89)
Service Time	29.129* (4.89)
Racial Minority	86.330 (79.07)
Committee Chair	10.549 (75.69)
Party Leader	285.949 (164.72)
Party	0.077 (.42)
District Effects Factor	62.895 (35.68)
R ²	0.5361
N	7493

* p<0.05

Cell entries report OLS Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Congress dummy variables are not included in the presentation of the models.

Table A7: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Predicting Legislative Issue Concentration Competition and Gender

Dependent Variable	Marginal Males	Safe Females	Marginal Females
Macroeconomics	-.167 (.21)	-1.391* (.42)	-1.963* (.65)
Civil Rights, Liberties, and Minority Issues	.033 (.123)	.614* (.262)	.767* (.40)
Health	-.503+ (.28)	3.743* (.56)	4.484* (.87)
Agriculture	-.102 (.22)	-.414 (.41)	-1.770* (.67)
Labor, Employment, and Immigration	-.704* (.24)	1.277* (.49)	-1.001 (.76)
Education	.289 (.20)	.442 (.40)	1.805* (.62)
Environment	-.097 (.22)	-.257 (.44)	-.570 (.67)
Energy	.304 (.19)	-.943* (.39)	-.699 (.60)
Transportation	-.257 (.23)	.368 (.48)	-.821 (.75)
Law, Crime and Family	.053 (.25)	1.212* (.50)	.722 (.77)
Social Welfare	.115 (.18)	1.180* (.37)	-.349 (.57)
Community Development and Housing	.001 (.15)	-.300 (.30)	.341 (.45)
Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce	.216 (.24)	-.381 (.49)	-1.196 (.74)
Defense	.510+ (.28)	-.307 (.58)	2.165* (.89)
Space, Science, Technology	-.131 (.13)	.076 (.26)	-.395 (.40)
Foreign Trade	-.604* (.28)	-.867 (.58)	-1.028 (.89)
International Affairs	-.064 (.16)	.675* (.33)	-.855 (.51)
Government Operations	-.112 (.35)	-1.89* (.72)	1.784 (1.12)
Public Lands and Water Management	.798* (.34)	-2.505* (.70)	-1.758+ (1.07)

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05

Cell entries are regression coefficients for the Marginal Males, Safe Females, and Marginal Females variables. In the left hand column are the dependent variables from the 20 regressions estimated in the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions equation. For space considerations, only the variables of interest are reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table A8: Time Series Negative Binomial Predicting the Number of Bills Sponsored by Party

Variable	Democrats	Republicans
Bills Sponsored _{t-1}	0.006* (0.00)	0.010* (0.00)
Marginal Males	0.058* (0.01)	-0.025 (0.30)
Safe Females	0.240* (0.00)	0.201* (0.01)
Marginal Females	0.105 (0.28)	0.251* (0.01)
Widow	0.052 (0.82)	-0.310 (0.28)
Service Time	-0.008* (0.01)	-0.002 (0.49)
Racial Minority	-0.103+ (0.07)	-0.171 (0.19)
Committee Chair	0.187* (0.00)	0.301* (0.00)
Party Leader	-0.458* (0.00)	-0.256* (0.01)
District Effects Factor	-0.060* (0.00)	0.009 (0.81)
Constant	2.588* (0.00)	2.989* (0.00)
Wald Chi ²	2611.89	1800.11
N	4432.000	3180.000

* p<0.05

Cell entries report coefficients from a Time Series Negative Binomial regression. Z-scores are in parentheses.

Table A9: Time Series OLS Regression Predicting Agenda Concentration by Party

Variable	Democrats	Republicans
HHI_{t-1}	0.416*	0.349*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	-204.381*	-290.534*
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Previous Electoral Margin	-0.351	-0.273
	(0.67)	(0.81)
Widow	-254.125	198.116
	(0.40)	(0.72)
Service Time	25.725*	38.107*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Racial Minority	52.529	454.665+
	(0.54)	(0.06)
Committee Chair	65.611	-79.220
	(0.45)	(0.63)
Party Leader	332.694	203.884
	(0.14)	(0.42)
District Effects Factor	83.656*	67.008
	(0.05)	(0.47)
Majority Party Member	-213.653	-929.169*
	(0.16)	(0.00)
Constant	1517.836*	2610.286*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	.451	.430
N	4355	3138

+ p_i0.10, * p_i0.05

Cell entries report coefficients from a Time Series OLS regression.

Table A10: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Predicting Legislative Issue Concentration for Republicans

Dependent Variable	Marginal Males	Safe Females	Marginal Females
Macroeconomics	-.424	-2.732*	-3.247*
Civil Rights, Liberties, and Minority Issues	.154	.234	-.011
Health	-.228	3.812*	2.318+
Agriculture	.633*	-.914	-1.800+
Labor, Employment, and Immigration	-.421	.931	-.412
Education	-.002	.168	1.504+
Environmental	-.082	-.080	-.468
Energy	.109	-.331	-.635
Transportation	.131	1.161	-.615
Law, Crime, and Family	.358	1.856*	.417
Social Welfare	-.412	.464	-.869
Community Development and Housing	.201	.160	.872
Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce	.458	-.092	-.378
Defense	.323	-1.635+	1.228
Space, Science, Technology	-.158	.039	-.091
Foreign Trade	-1.346*	.520	-1.836
International Affairs	.352	1.456*	-.771
Government Operations	-.738	-1.703	3.063*
Public Lands and Water Management	1.386*	-2.449*	1.104
Other	-.292	-.864	.630
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05			

Cell entries are regression coefficients for the Marginal Males, Safe Females, and Marginal Females variables. In the left hand column are the dependent variables from the 20 regressions estimated in the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions equation. For space considerations, only the variables of interest are reported.

Table A11: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Predicting Legislative Issue Concentration for Democrats

Dependent Variable	Marginal Males	Safe Females	Marginal Females
Macroeconomics	.270	-.697	-.682
Civil Rights, Liberties, and Minority Issues	-.157	.813*	1.465*
Health	-.764*	3.71*	6.337*
Agriculture	-.608*	-.278	-1.667+
Labor, Employment, and Immigration	-.857*	1.48*	-1.273
Education	.684*	.553	1.724*
Environmental	-.337	-.320	-.801
Energy	.416	-1.092*	-.623
Transportation	-.747*	-.118	-1.044
Law, Crime, and Family	.032	.838	1.286
Social Welfare	.662*	1.565*	.051
Community Development and Housing	.019	-.533	-.027
Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce	.194	-.553	-1.558
Defense	.015	.448	2.031+
Space, Science, Technology	-.144	-.140	-.658
Foreign Trade	-.368	-1.352*	-.847
International Affairs	-4.19+	.243	-.724
Government Operations	.931+	-2.041*	1.221
Public Lands and Water Management	.321	-2.551*	-4.176*
Other	.846+	.031	-.017

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05

Cell entries are regression coefficients for the Marginal Males, Safe Females, and Marginal Females variables. In the left hand column are the dependent variables from the 20 regressions estimated in the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions equation. For space considerations, only the variables of interest are reported.

Table A12: Time Series Negative Binomial Predicting the Number of Bills Sponsored by Congressional “Era”

Variable	1963-1970	1971-1992	1993-2008
Bills Sponsored _{t-1}	0.005* (0.00)	0.006* (0.00)	0.018* (0.00)
Gender	0.138 (0.19)	0.195* (0.08)	0.192* (0.05)
Previous Electoral Margin	-0.002* (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Widow	.	-0.161 (0.25)	0.183 (0.19)
Service Time	-0.016* (0.01)	-0.002 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Racial Minority	-0.067 (0.21)	-0.013 (0.07)	-0.137* (0.06)
Committee Chair	0.036 (0.10)	0.197* (0.03)	0.341* (0.04)
Party Leader	-0.868* (0.39)	-0.300* (0.10)	-0.316* (0.12)
District Effects Factor	0.036 (0.05)	-0.013 (0.02)	-0.000 (0.03)
Majority Party Member			-0.137* (0.04)
Constant	2.853* (0.11)	2.073* (0.05)	1.968* (0.09)
Wald Chi ²	165.76	2217.61	712.77
N	1061.000	3995.000	2508.000

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05

Cell entries report coefficients from a Time Series Negative Binomial regression. Congress dummy variables are not included in the presentation of the models. Z-scores are in parentheses.

Table A13: Time Series OLS Regression Predicting Agenda Concentration by Era

Variable	1963-1970	1971-1992	1993-2008
HHI _{t-1}	0.504*	0.290*	0.340*
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Gender	-108.043	-164.226	-325.476*
	(282.63)	(152.62)	(116.74)
Previous Electoral Margin	-0.651	-0.071	-1.127
	(1.47)	(0.87)	(1.33)
Widow	.	-339.324	-105.311
	.	(471.29)	(474.14)
Service Time	43.595*	26.312*	28.928*
	(11.89)	(7.66)	(9.37)
Racial Minority	165.243	-62.771	359.285*
	(312.27)	(147.53)	(132.51)
Committee Chair	295.794	56.879	-207.186
	(226.59)	(100.72)	(153.12)
Party Leader	118.780	-0.062	637.760*
	(514.34)	(241.17)	(299.48)
District Effects Factor	92.601	152.444*	-78.838
	(92.12)	(54.23)	(63.70)
Constant	606.610*	1368.596*	1608.017*
	(113.16)	(96.48)	(134.97)
R ²	.382	.395	.411
N	1058	3962	2482

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05

Cell entries report coefficients from a Time Series OLS regression. Congress dummy variables are not included in the presentation of the models. Z-scores are in parentheses.

Table A14: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Predicting Legislative Issue Concentration by Era

Dependent Variable	1971-1992	1993-2008
Macroeconomics	-.555 (.61)	-2.365* (.55)
Civil Rights, Liberties, and Minority Issues	1.013* (.36)	.290 (.34)
Health	3.971* (.75)	5.515* (.82)
Agriculture	-1.827 (.69)	-.189 (.43)
Labor, Employment, and Immigration	1.011 (.75)	1.068+ (.60)
Education	-.024 (.54)	.847 (.56)
Environment	-.445 (.67)	-.174 (.55)
Energy	-1.402* (.63)	-.821+ (.46)
Transportation	-.003 (.73)	.260 (.58)
Law, Crime and Family	0.598 (.75)	1.399* (.61)
Social Welfare	1.891* (0.31)	-.009 (.37)
Community Development and Housing	-0.350 (.42)	-.257 (.39)
Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce	-2.037 (0.69)	-.179 (.64)
Defense	0.106 (.81)	.721 (.73)
Space, Science, Technology	-1.159 (0.39)	.631+ (.32)
Foreign Trade	-0.219 (0.71)	-1.304 (.87)
International Affairs	-0.341 (.53)	.661+ (.38)
Government Operations	2.143* (1.08)	-2.873* (.87)
Public Lands and Water Management	-3.059* (1.02)	-2.472* (.87)

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05

Cell entries are regression coefficients for the Female indicator variable. In the left hand column are the dependent variables from the 20 regressions estimated in the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions equation. For space considerations, only the variables of interest are reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.